This paper investigates the impact of restricting bilateral trade imbalances in a very simple three country, three good model. The pattern of bilateral trade balances matters because in the Nash equilibrium, each country will impose tariffs on countries with whom they have bilateral deficits or promote trade with countries with whom they have bilateral surpluses. Nevertheless, all countries lose from a Nash country-bashing war. It is shown that while each country loses from the unilateral elimination of its bilateral imbalances, a country can gain from a bilateral agreement with its deficit partner provided that country has a surplus with a country devoted to free trade. The incentive of individual countries to bash other countries in a multilateral world gives an argument for a world trade agreement.
1 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and Southern Methodist University; University of Houston and Research Associate, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. We wish to thank David Gould for his insightful comments and Levent Akdeniz for his assistance. The views expressed here are the anthors and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System. 'The evidence that the U.S. bilateral deficit with Japan is due to Japanese policies is mostly anecdotal. For example, stories abound that Japan's complex distribution system, exclusionary business practices, and lax antitrust enforcement are responsible for the deficit. Regression analysis tells a different story. Saxonhouse (1983 Saxonhouse ( ,1986 ) preseuts cross-country regressions in which Japan is shown to be no more protectionist than other advanced countries. Zwiebel (1993) applies the Saxonhouse methodology to a smaller set of countries (the Group of Seven) and finds that Japan imports more than the predicted amounts for most manufacturing industries while the United States imports less. Although Lawrence (1987) reached different conclusions, it is reasonable to conclnde, along with Bhagwati (1989) , that Japan is not "asymmetrically denying access to its markets in manufactures" (Bhagwati, 1989,p. 70). theorists have paid little attention to the study of bilateral imbalances.' Indeed, we are not aware of a single paper that explores the welfare consequences of controlling bilateral trade imbalances. 4 This paper extends the theory of optimal tariffs to consider country-bashing tariffs, that IS, tariffs or subsidies on the goods from particular countries. We explore bilateral trade issues by developing a very simple, three country, three good model that higWights the welfare aspects of bilateral trade. In our model, a country can lower its bilateral trade deficit with one of its trading partners by either taxing that country's goods or by subsidizing imports from the other country. Uniform import or export tariffs have no impact. Thus, the only tariffs that have any impact in our model are differential tariffs or subsidies. Specific country-bashing tariffs hurt one trading partner and help the other. For example, when the U.S. imposes tariffs on Japanese luxury cars, the effect is equivalent to a subsidy on German or Swedish luxury cars.
To focus squarely on the issue of bilateral trade imbalances, we abstract from the usual optimal tariff argument. The standard theory of optimal tariffs applies to the imposition of tariffs by one country on goods from the rest of the world. From this literature, economists know that a large country can gain by cutting its exports to the rest of the world, even if other countries retaliate (Johnson, 1953) . But just as it was useful for trade theorists to abstract from comparative advantage to study intra-industry trade (Krugman, 1979) , so it may prove useful to abstract from the common optimum tariff argument in order to more clearly understand the economics of bilateral trade.
, The emphasis has been on explaining bilateral trade flows by using tbe gravity equation. See Anderson (1979) , Helpman and Krugman (1985) , Bergstrom (1987) , and Thursby and Thursby (1987) .
We show that eliminating bilateral trade deficits unilaterally is always harmful. An incipient, unanswered, country-bashing tariff on the deficit partner (or subsidy on the surplus partner), however, is always beneficial.' But if all countries play this game, all lose. Thus, it is no more irrational for countries to focus on the pattern of bilateral trade deficits and surpluses than for prisoners to confess in the prisoners' dilemma game. Indeed, we find that for our model the Nash equilibrium for country-bashing tariffs involves the partial elimination of a bilateral imbalances. This may in part explain why countries are so concerned with bilateral imbalances. The result is also reflective of the concerns of trade theorists: if all countries lose from a Nash country-bashing war, focusing on bilateral deficits turns out to be a self-defeating policy.
In our model, if in free trade there are no bilateral imbalances, then the Nash equilibrium is also free trade. If one country nevertheless imposes a tariff, the country on whom the tariff has been imposed will now have a bilateral deficit with that country and will have an incentive to retaliate.
In general, when we move away from Nash games, we find that if one country insists on free trade, the partner with whom it has a bilateral deficit can actually gain from forcing the remaining country into a bilateral agreement that eliminates or reduces their bilateral trade deficit. This is accomplished by threatening even more damaging unilateral action.
Section I illustrates the setup with a simple example and diagram that can be used to show how bilateral trade works. Section II formally presents the formal model, derives the equilibrium for any vector of tariffs, and shows that a common country-bashing tariff harms all countries. Section III computes the Nash equilibrium and shows how the pattern of bilateral balances determines the costs and benefits of country-bashing. Section IV examines the welfare consequences of eliminating bilateral trade deficits and presents a simple measurement of the bilateral trade deficit. Section V presents an argument for a world trade agreement that is truly multilateral (three or more countries). Section VI states the conclusions.
I. Introduction and Preview
Bilateral trade imbalances arise because in a multilateral world reciprocal demands between any pair of countries need not be the same. Endowment or preference asymmetries give rise to divergent incipient relative prices across trading partners, and thus to welfare gains from bilateral trade imbalances with those partners.
Suppose there are three countries: A, B, and C. Country A is endowed with apples, B is endowed with bananas, and C is endowed with cherries. Each country likes and consumes only the goods from the other two countries. Assume country A spends more on bananas than cherries; B spends more on cherries than apples; and C spends more on apples than bananas.
With free trade, this means that country A must have a bilateral trade deficit with country B, while it has a bilateral trade surplus with country C. The other countries are in a similar situation.
Assume, for example, that each country always spends 75 percent of its income on its favored good and the other 25 percent on the other good. Then each country's welfare or real income can be measured by the utility function: U = X"Y", where X is the favored good and Y is the other good. Now, suppose further that each country is endowed with 100 pounds of its fruit. The free trade consumption and utility pattern of each country is thus easy to describe.
Because of the symmetry of the assumptions, in a free trade equilibrium all prices will be exactly the same. Thus, we may let the free trade price of each fruit be $1 a pound. Each country's income will be exactly $100; and each will spend $75 on its favored good. Figure 1 shows the 4 free trade solution for, say, country A. It consumes at point F and its utility level is U = 56.99.
In the free trade equilibrium country A exports $25 worth of apples to country B and $75 to country C. In turn, country A imports $75 worth of bananas from country B and $25 worth of cherries from country C. Thus, as with the other countries, country A has a $50 deficit with country B and a $50 trade surplus with country C. The total trade account is balanced.
Suppose now all of the countries become concerned with their trade imbalances. If a multilateral policy were followed in which each country imposed the same country-bashing tariff on its favored import until bilateral imbalance were eliminated, then every country would consume 50 pounds of each imported fruit. This must be the case because with the same tariffs, the world prices of each fruit must be identical (say, again, $1). For every country now to consume 50 pounds of each imported fruit, it is necessary that each country impose a tariff rate It is clear that if country A proceeded unilaterally to eliminate its bilateral trade deficit, it would have to impose a much larger country-bashing tariff on B. Country A's consumption of bananas, its favored good, would have to drop below 50 pounds. We shall see below that if country A goes alone, it will move all the way to point L, where its consumption pattern is completely reversed from the free trade level! Point N will be shown to be the Nash equilibrium.
II. The basic model
In this section we set out the model, derive the general tariff-distorted equilibrium, and discuss the benchmark case in which all countries follow identical policies.
There are three countries and three goods, as in our numerical example. For notational convenience we call the countries and goods 1, 2, and 3. We let good 3 be the numeraire.
Country i has a fixed endowment of good i and consumes the other two goods. Preferences are described by identically symmetrical Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Country 1 favors good 2, 2 favors 3, and 3 favors 1. We designate (usually) good j as i's favored good. Country i consumes goods j and k, and its utility function is:
Thus, each country spends b times as much on its favored good (good j) as on the other good, so that b > 1. If b = 1, there would be no bilateral deficits under free trade.
Each country faces the budget constraint
where cij is the consumption of good j by country i, X; is country i's fixed endowment of good i, and Pi is the world price of good i. Note that any tax/subsidy structure by country i on both import goods can be replicated as an equivalent tariff on the favored good, called t i , which is defined t i =~/t"" where~m is unity plus the ad valorem tariff country i imposes on good m.
Clearly,~> 1 is consistent with~j > 1 (a tax on i's favored good) or t", < I (a subsidy on i's other import). Thus, the domestic relative price of i's favored good in terms of its other import is P}/Pk' Since consumers adjust their marginal rates of substitution to domestic prices, the consumption pattern of each country must satisfy:
Clearly, uniform import taxes (or an export tax) wash out in this model.
Assuming that tariff revenues or subsidies are redistributed as lump-sum transfers to or from consumers, equations (2) and (3) imply that the solutions for country i's consumption pattern are:
The market clearing equations can be written:
Equations (4) and (5) can be substituted into equations (6)- (7) to solve for PI and P2
(noting p, = I):
where (10) Blj =b 2 +bt, Hit j .
It is clear from (8) and (9) that when all tariff rates are the same the prices of goods 1 and 2 in terms of good 3 simply reflect their relative supplies. That is, PI = x,/X; when t l = t, for all i because all the terms involving b cancel. Of course, this solution is intuitively obvious because when country demands are symmetric and tariffs are equal, only relative supplies matter. Since world prices are not affected in this case, it must follow that each country is made worse off by matching country-bashing tariffs (just as for the small country in standard trade theory).
In the general case where tariff rates are unequal, the consumption pattern for country i is [Using (4), (5), (8), and (9)]:
If all countries impose the same country-bashing tariff (t), the Bi;'s cancel and the consumption pattern is:
c ij = bx/(t+b); and c ik = tx,l(t+b).
It clearly follows that the utility level is:
Summarizing from equation (12) It is easy to show from equation (13) that du/dt < O. As we remarked earlier, this result is not surprising. Everyone loses from a country-bashing war in which countries impose the same tariff on their favored good. This result stands in sharp contrast to that from the conventional theory of optimum tariffs in which, as is well known, large countries can gain from a matching tariff war. Indeed, we have completely abstracted from the usual optimum tariff argument, which relies on the ability of a country to control its exports. In our model, exports are fixed.
A trivial corollary to Proposition 1 is useful:
Corollary 1: Under free trade, each country consumes the share bl(1 +b) of the world supply of its favored good and the share 11(1 +b) of the world supply of the other import.
III. The Nash Equilibrium
We now examine the Nash equilibrium in which each country sets its tariff rate so as to maximize domestic welfare on the assumption that the other countries will not retaliate. 6 There is an incentive for each country to impose a country-bashing tariff. The reason is simple:
countries spend more on their favored good. An incipient tariff on the favored good, therefore, improves the country's terms of trade on its most important good and worsens its terms of trade on the relatively unimportant good. Welfare thus improves. As the country-bashing tariff is increased on the favored good, the volume of trade falls for that good and rises for the other good. Eventnally, the welfare gain from reducing bilateral deficits ceases.
Solving for the Nash equilibrium is straightforward. Using (I) and (11), the utility for country i is simply,
u
where a is a constant reflecting the endowments and the Bijs are defined as in (10). Equating aui at i to zero implies (15) Bi}itk = bB ki .
Thus, due to symmetry in the Nash equilibrium, all 1;'s are the same (t).' That is,
Substituting (15) into (12) shows the consumption pattern in the Nash equilibrium. From (16) and Proposition I, we get :
Proposition 2. In the Nash eqnilibrium, 1, = b" 2 for each i, and each country consumes the share b 1l2 /(1 +b"
2 ) of the world supply of its favored good and the share 11(1 +b 'J2 ) of the world supply of the other import good.
Note that if b exceeds I, then t exceeds 1. The implication is that, starting from free trade, each country generally (b > 1) has an incentive to either impose a tariff on goods from its deficit partner or subsidize imports from its surplus partner. It follows that the bilateral trade deficit in the Nash equilibrium is smaller than that under free trade. In the next section we show that when t = b, bilateral deficits are eliminated. In the Nash case, however, t < b and bilateral deficits remain.
It is important to note that a country's incentive to impose a tariff depends on the state of its bilateral imbalances, whatever may be their cause. To illustrate this, consider the case where under free trade there are no bilateral imbalances (b = I), so that the Nash equilibrium , It is trivial to show that the symmetric solution is unique.
9 is the free trade equilibrium. If one country then imposes a tariff, the country on whom the tariff has been imposed will have a bilateral deficit with that country, and an incentive to retaliate. From equation (15), ift,=1 and b = I, country I'soptimal tariff is determined by t/(I +1:,) = 2. Therefore, if t ,< I (country 2 imposes a tariff on country I or gives a subsidy to country 3), it pays country I to impose a tariff on country 2's export. In short, the incentive to retaliate depends on trade patterns alone, and not on whether those patterns stem from innate preferences or inane policies.
IV. Measuring and Eliminating Bilateral Deficits
The Nash equilibrium is compelling because it represents the rational expectations solution to trade wars and is self-reinforcing. However, since politicians and pundits almost universally condemn bilateral deficits, it is interesting to examine the consequences of their elimination.
Bilateral trade deficits, of course, should be expressed proportionately -that is, i's deficit where wij = (Ph + PiCjY(P,xj + p,x, + p,x,).
It is interesting to note that if a country begins to unilaterally bash another country, its Proposition 4 (the unilateral case): For country i to unilaterally eliminate its bilateral trade 'Let Sij represent country i's surplus with country j, Since S12 + S13 = S21 + S" = S31 + S'2 = 0, it follows that S12 = 0 implies all the S'j are zero.
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deficit when free trade prevails elsewhere, its country-bashing tariff must be t, = b'.
Proposition 5 (the bilateral case): For countries 1 and 2 to jointly eliminate their bilateral deficits, while country 3 is a free trader, each country-bashing tariff must be t, = t, = b,n.
Let us now study the welfare consequences of eliminating bilateral imbalances. For reference, recall that under free trade each country consumes the share b/(1 + b) of the world supply of its favored good, the share 1/(1 + b) of world supply of its other import, and utility is (22) u i = [bb x ;'x,lll('+ bl /(l +b).
The unilateral case. Suppose now country 1 faces free trade elsewhere in the world but decides to unilaterally eliminate its bilateral trade deficit with country 2. Proposition 4 tells us that in this case its tariff should be t, = b'. To find the effects of this policy we substitute t l = b' and t, = t, = 1 into equation (11). The effects on utility and consumption patterns are dramatic. Table 1 shows the consumption pattern for the general case as well as for our numerical 
The ratio of free-trade utility to utility in the unilateral case is b(b-IYCI+b). Under our example (b = 3) this ratio equals 1.73, so that real income is 73 percent higher in free trade. Unilaterally eliminating the trade deficit is indeed "grossly misguided. "
Country 2, the object of country 1's displeasure, is even more severely damaged (see Table 1 ). Country 2 now consumes only 1/(1 +b) of the world supply of its favored good and The answer is: No. Consider the case where country 3 -the country with whom 1 has a surplus -insists on free trade. This liberates country 1, because it knows that its export will always be exempted from tariffs. Accordingly, country 1 can become very aggressive. If country 1 proceeds unilaterally, as we have just seen (b = 3), it can destroy about 65 percent of country 2's real income. Remember that country 2's bashing of country 3 is equivalent to 2's subsidizing imports from 1. In return for country 1 reducing its tariffs on good 2 from t, = b' to t, = b in free trade and country 2 is better off than it would be if country 1 proceeded unilaterally.' Surprisingly, country 3 is driven to its Nash equilibrium consumption pattern and is, thus, even better off than if all countries imposed the tariff t = b (see below).
Country 1 is better off when both countries impose country-bashing tariffs since it is the only country that then faces free trade for its export and since the price of its export good rises relative to both of its import goods. Thus, in general, a country benefits from two types of action: its restrained but unanswered bashing of the trading partner who supplies its favored good; or that country engaging in a similar act. Each policy ultimately has the effect of improving the home country's terms of trade.
Nothing is worse for nation than to have a bilateral trade deficit with a strict free-trading nation, because such a country will not bash your arch-enemies. A country's arch-enemy is the country with whom it has a bilateral trade surplus, because it will be the potential target of country-bashing tariffs. Having a deficit with a free-trading nation puts a country in the position of always being the potential target, and never the potential beneficiary, of other countries' wars.
The multilateral case. We already studied multilateral agreements in Propositions 1 and countries, as well as the prices of goods 1 and 2 for the five distinct cases of interest: Free trade (column 1); the Nash equilibrium (column 2); the multilateral case (column 3); the bilateral case (column 4); and the unilateral case (column 5).
V. An Argument for a World Trade Agreement
We believe this paper gives a genuine argument for a world trade agreement, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) -the new incarnation of GATT {General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The usual argument for a WTO is but a mere extension of the old bilateral one that a reciprocal reduction of tariffs helps two trading partners. 1O This argument is weak in two ways. First, it is not really a multllateral argument (two countries suffice). And, moreover, in a two-country model the big country can win a tariff war.
Using the insights of this paper we believe that there are three arguments for a world trade agreement. First, a multilateral free trade agreement avoids country-bashing trade (Nash) wars that make all parties worse off. Second, the existence of a staunchly liberal trading country can create opportunities for aggressive bilateral policies on the part of countries that have surpluses with that nation. Third, though not a direct implication of our specific model, even a large country may want to join a multilateral agreement in order to minimize being the target of country-bashing tariffs from other countries.
Unfortunately, the new WTO does not specifically prohibit country-bashing. Though each country can take its case to the WTO, it remains to be seen how the WTO will respond to the country-bashing efforts of its members -particularly larger ones. Our paper suggests that there ought to be a provision in WTO that outlaws the type of behavior the United States has been engaging in relative to Japan. The danger, however, is that such a provision could lead to America's withdrawal from the WTO.
10 See McMillan (1986, pp. 31-32) for a discussion of GATT games.
VII. Conclusion
The pattern of bilateral balances matters. In the Nash equilibrium, each country will bash countries with whom they have bilateral deficits or promote trade with countries with whom they have bilateral surpluses. Nevertheless, all countries lose from a Nash countrybashing war. If a single country eliminates its bilateral deficit, it still loses even if the rest of the world does not retaliate. But if a country has a trade surplus with a free trading nation, it can gain from a bilateral agreement with its deficit partner to eliminate the bilateral deficit. On the other hand, a country whose trade deficit is with a free-trading nation is in a disadvantageous position because the free-trading nation will not bash its enemies and will always be the target of country-bashing by other countries.
A great deal of work remains to be done on the empirical and theoretical aspects of bilateral trade deficits. Many questions can be asked. 
